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The use of military force to forestall humanitarian crisis remains a controversial issue in 
international law. This strategy is considered antithetical to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the host country. This legal quandary emanated in 1998 after NATO launched 
a series of airstrikes against the Yugoslavian forces under the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention. This legal conundrum prompted the United Nations to craft comprehensive 
legal principles to determine the parameters of foreign interventions in armed conflict. 
The objective was realised in 2005 after the UN adopted the Right to Protect (R2P) as 
means of resolving humanitarian crisis. This doctrine intended to harmonise the foreign 
intervention in light of the shortcomings of unilateral humanitarian intervention. However, 
the abysmal failure in resolving the Libyan crisis exposed its soft underbelly as tool for 
perpetuating regime change against unpopular leaders. Subsequently, when Security 
Council proposed similar remedy for Syrian conflict, Russia strenuously objected and 
advocated for a political and diplomatic solution. This geopolitical gridlock prompted the 
divided council to adopt a different scenario in dealing with the Syrian conflict with the 
west supporting the rebels while Russia stood by Assad. This prompted Assad to appeal for 
assistance from Russia in counteracting ISIS and rebel forces that threatened to depose his 
government. In 2017 President Putin announced the success of the Russian intervention 
and called for peace talks among the various warring factions. As such Russia had realised 
the humanitarian objective behind R2P while respecting the sovereignty of Syria.
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Introduction
the political turmoil in syria remains one of the most volatile and catastrophic 
phenomenon of the 21st century.1 this appraisal is drawn from the horrific statistics 
which indicate the conflict has left close to 100,000 civilians dead while displacing 
almost 9 million with most of them seeking refuge in the Middle east and europe.2 
in essence, this multifaceted conflict has fragmented the country along the fault 
1  Laurie r. Blank & Geoffrey s. Corn, The Law of War’s Essential Role in Containing Brutality: Syria’s Painful 
Reminder, Global Policy essay (2013) (Jun. 5, 2018), available at https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/
articles/conflict-and-security/law-wars-essential-role-containing-brutality-syrias-painful-reminder.
2  Azfer Ali khan, Can International Law Manage Refugee Crises?, 5 Oxford university undergraduate Law 
Journal 54 (2016).
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lines of religion, ethnicity and to some degree geopolitical interests.3 On one hand, 
the government forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad are battling the western 
supported rebels informally known as “Free syria Movement” who are seeking to 
gain control of the country. Conversely, the ultra-fundamentalist islamic state (used 
interchangeably with isis and daesh) intends to establish a religious caliphate 
traversing the entire Middle east region.4 this terror group has committed countless of 
violence against the yazidi women including sexual enslavement, honour killings and 
human trafficking.5 Furthermore, its adherents are accused of perpetrating religious 
cleansing against minority Christians and plundering their property and holy sites.6
throughout the course of the conflict the west has vilified President Assad 
as the principal perpetrator of the atrocities besetting the country.7 this blanket 
condemnation prompted the North Atlantic treaty Organisation (NAtO) aligned 
states to shore up support for the rebels as strategy of expelling President Assad 
from office.8 the Arab league followed suit by slapping syria with sanctions and 
demanding the immediate resignation of President Assad.9 however, this indictment 
is biased and inconclusive after the united Nations (hereinafter the uN) prepared 
a comprehensive report which incriminated both sides for the atrocities.10 
On the opposite end of the spectrum russian President vladimir Putin has 
remained steadfast in supporting the regime. he has reiterated President Assad 
is the legitimate leader of syria and should be involved in any dispute resolution 
mechanism.11 Furthermore, russia has vetoed any resolution by the security Council 
(used interchangeably with the council) seeking to invoke military intervention in 
3  Alex schank, Sectarianism and Transitional Justice in Syria: Resisting International Trials, 45 Georgetown 
Journal of international Law 557, 559 (2014).
4  emin daskin, Justification of Violence by Terrorist Organisations: Comparing ISIS and PKK, Journal of 
intelligence and terrorism studies 1, 6 (2016).
5  Mah-rukh Ali, ISIS and Propaganda: How ISIS Exploits Women, reuters institute for the study of 
Journalism (2015) (Jun. 5, 2018), available at http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/
files/research/files/isis%2520and%2520Propaganda-%2520how%2520isis%2520exploits%2520w
omen.pdf.
6  Michael solomatin, The Unjust War in the Syrian Arab Republic and the Protection of Syrian Churches as 
Cultural Property, 6 Ave Maria international Law Journal spring 88, 99 (2017).
7  Matthew C. waxman, Syria, Threats of Force, and Constitutional War Powers, 123(6) yale Law Journal 
297 (2013).
8  Amos N. Guiora, Intervention in Libya, Yes; Intervention in Syria, No: Deciphering the Obama Administration, 
44 Case western reserve Journal of international Law 251, 271 (2011).
9  thilo Marauhn, Sailing Close to the Wind: Human Rights Council Fact-Finding in Situations of Armed 
Conflict – The Case of Syria, 43 California western international Law Journal 402, 411 (2013).
10  draft uN resolution, uN doc s/2012/77, 4 February 2012.
11  Muditha halliyade, Syria – Another Drawback for R2P?: An Analysis of R2P’s Failure to Change International 
Law on Humanitarian Intervention, 4(2) indian Journal of Law & social equality 215, 215 (2016).
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syria for fear of regime change. President Putin drew a perfect comparison with Libya 
where NAtO used humanitarian concerns as an excuse to dislodge Colonel Gaddafi 
from power only to leave behind a failed and fractured state.12 subsequently, russia 
offered the regime military support in combating the rebels and jihadist who were 
determined to gain control of the country. this last resort measure has prompted 
the west to accuse Moscow of complicity to the alleged atrocities committed by 
the Assad regime.13 
however, in september 2015 this conflict took a totally different turn after russia 
became actively engaged in the conflict at the behest of the President Assad. the 
russian armed forces launched a series of surgical air strikes and deployed ground 
troops to reinforce the government forces in countering the islamic state.14 After 
two years of vigorous battles isis was ultimately neutralised thereby enabling the 
regime to regain significant control of the country. in december 2017 President 
Putin made a victory tour of syria to commemorate the successful military campaign 
whereupon he announced the partial withdrawal of russian troops from the county.15 
Furthermore, he expressed his desire to mediate post-conflict reconciliation among 
the various factions in the country.16 despite this self-evident triumph the west 
has viewed the russian support with suspicion of protecting its economic and 
geopolitical interests in the region.17 some analysts argue russian support for the 
Assad regime is the precursor to the resumption of a “new cold war.”18 Nonetheless, 
these concerns seem antiquated since russia has always advocated for a political and 
diplomatic solution to the conflict while strenuously opposing the use of force.19
12  Jon Austin, US and NATO Want Syria to Be the Next Libya – Claims Assad and Putin “GOOD Guys” of Conflict, 
express, 2 August 2017 (Jun. 5, 2018), available at https://www.express.co.uk/news/weird/836154/
syria-war-vladimir-Putin-russia-President-Assad-good-guys-Nato.
13  derek Averre & Lance davies, Russia, Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility to Protect: The Case 
of Syria, 91(4) international Affairs 813, 814 (2015).
14  Marauhn 2013, at 414.
15  Nathan hodge, Putin Declares Victory in Surprise Stopover in Syria, wall street Journal, 11 december 
2017 (Jun. 5, 2018), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-declares-victory-in-surprise-
stopover-in-syria-1512994876.
16  raf sanchez, Bashar Al-Assad Thanks Putin for “Saving Our Country” as Russian Leader Prepares for 
Talks on Ending Syrian War, the telegraph, 21 November 2017 (Jun. 5, 2018), available at https://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/21/bashar-al-assad-says-ready-syria-peace-talks-rare-meeting-
vladimir/.
17  Caitlyn A. Buckley, Learning from Libya, Acting in Syria, 5(2) Journal of strategic security 82, 83 
(2012).
18  Russia, Syria, and the “New Cold War,” Journal of Middle eastern Politics and Policy, 18 december 2016 
(Jun. 5, 2018), available at http://jmepp.hkspublications.org/2016/12/18/syria-russia-new-cold-war/.
19  reuters staff, Russia Says Opposes Any Resolution Threatening Force Against Syria, 22 september 2013 
(Jun. 5, 2018), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/syria-crisis-russia/russia-says-opposes-
any-resolution-threatening-force-against-syria-idusL5N0hi0A020130922.
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Looking at the bigger picture russian intervention in syrian falls well within the 
ambit of the right to Protect (used interchangeably with r2P) under international 
humanitarian law. this amorphous policy formulated in 2005 maps out the terrains 
of foreign humanitarian assistance during armed conflicts.20 secondly, russian 
intervention safeguarded syria’s sovereignty since it was undertaken at the behest 
of President Assad who is the de facto leader of the country.21 in stark contrast the 
western countries decision to support the rebels was initiated in flippant disregard 
of principle of international law that prohibits illegal use of force against a sovereign 
state.22 As the iCJ held in Nicaragua v. USA and DRC v. Uganda funding of armed 
resistance is tantamount to infringing upon a country’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.23 As i shall argue the approach by NAtO raises serious legitimate issues 
regarding the culpability of the syrian rebels as active participants in the conflict. 
this brief historical antecedent forms the focal point of this manuscript. Broadly 
speaking i argue the russian military support of the Assad regime falls well within the 
scope of the right to Protect. in contradistinction the western approach of supporting 
the rebels is blotted with serious legal ramifications in both international and 
humanitarian laws. this manuscript is divided into five major segments. the first portion 
underscores an elaborate discussion of the historical development of the doctrine of 
the right to Protect (r2P). it outlines the legal position of this doctrine in light of the 
ever changing dynamics of the international law. the second segment shall discuss the 
syrian conflict. this portion forms the main focus of this paper by expounding on the 
international humanitarian issues about the conflict. the third portion shall encompass 
a comprehensive discussion of the russian intervention in syria. Furthermore, it will give 
a brief synopsis of Putin’s ascension to power and how his foreign policy transformed the 
geopolitical landscape. the fourth portion shall flesh out the fundamental distinction 
between the russian and western intervention in syria. Moreover, this segment shall 
discuss the jurisprudence on this subject matter as enunciated by the international 
Court of Justice (iCJ).24 the fifth portion shall entail a general overview of the problem 
together with some concluding remarks from the author.
20  tomas königs et al., Responsibility to Protect: Implementing a Global Norm Towards Peace and Security, 
29(76) utrecht Journal of international and european Law 109, 110 (2013).
21  samuel Mercier, The Legality of Russian Airstrike in Syria and “Intervention by Invitation,” e-international 
relations, 29 April 2016 (Jun. 5, 2018), available at http://www.e-ir.info/2016/04/29/the-legality-of-
russian-airstrikes-in-syria-and-intervention-by-invitation/.
22  Julian e. Barnes et al., Obama Proposes $500 Million to Aid Syrian Rebels, the wall street Journal, 
26 June 2014 (Jun. 5, 2018), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-proposes-500-million-
to-aid-syrian-rebels-1403813486.
23  Alexis Goh & steven Freeland, The International Court of Justice and Recent Orders on Provisional 
Measures, 11 Australian Journal of international Law 47, 48 (2004).
24  A. Mark weisburd, The International Court of Justice and the Concept of State Practice, 31(2) university 
of Pennsylvania Journal of international Law 295, 297 (2009).
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1. General Background on the Right to Protect (R2P)
1.1. The Pre-Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention Era
By and large, international law enshrines the norms governing the relationship 
among nation states. this unique framework is largely attributed to hugo Grotius who 
popularised the term jus gentium (laws of the nation) which envisages a community 
nations posited within a common legal order.25 this notion was later codified in 
1648 when european powers signed the treaty of westphalia thereby ending the 
thirty years war.26 this futuristic document laid the foundation for modern precepts 
of sovereignty and statehood by defining territorial integrity and state autonomy.27 
despite these tremendous steps interstate relationships were inundated with legal 
loopholes and frictions that erupted into world war i in 1914.28 After the war the allied 
victors envisioned a new world order governed by the League of Nations.29 however, 
this supranational organisation failed to realise its objective after europe relapsed 
into a diabolical arms race and annexations which triggered the outbreak of world 
war ii.30 similarly, the ultimate defeat of the axis powers reshaped the international 
legal order after the allies lobbied for the formation of the united Nations (hereinafter 
the uN).31 this global body succeeded the defunct League of Nations in overseeing 
the relationship among the member states.32 this led to the promulgation of the 
united Nations Charter in 1945 which delineated the boundaries on the use of force 
by the member states.33 Pursuant to Arts. 2(4) and 51 of the charter the use of force 
is restricted to the purpose of self-defense.34 By narrowing this scope, the framers 
of the charter intended to safeguard the territorial integrity of the member states 
25  harold hongju koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106(8) yale Law Journal 2559, 2605 (1997).
26  Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42(1) American Journal of international Law 20, 22 (1948).
27  daud hassan, The Rise of the Territorial State and the Treaty of Westphalia, 9 yearbook of New Zealand 
Jurisprudence 62, 63 (2006).
28  talbot C. imlay, The Origins of the First World War, 49(4) the historical Journal 1253, 1255 (2006).
29  Anne Marie slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 
87(2) American Journal of international Law 205, 210 (1993).
30  robert J. delahunty & John C. yoo, Peace Through Law – The Failure of a Noble Experiment, 106 Michigan 
Law Journal 923, 926 (2007).
31  John humphrey, The Main Functions of the United Nations in the Year 2000 A.D., 17(1) McGill Law 
Journal 219, 220 (2000).
32  Leland M. Goodrich, From the League of Nations to United Nations, 1(1) international Organization 3, 
9 (1947).
33  Charter of the united Nations and statute of the international Court of Justice (san Francisco 1945) 
(Jun. 5, 2018), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf.
34  david k. Linnan, Self-Defense, Necessity and U.N. Collective Security: United States and Other Views, 1 
duke Journal of Comparative & international Law 57, 66 (1991).
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from needless infringement by powerful and aggressive countries.35 eugene rostow 
noted these dual provisions chrystallised the use of force strictly for the purpose of 
self-defense as part of customary international law.36 in addition to these clauses, 
the obligation to preserve international peace and stability was bestowed upon the 
security Council which comprised of the former allies powers during the war.37 
Aside from the uN Charter, the global human rights regime underwent 
a metamorphosis after the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention of 
Genocide and the Geneva Conventions on the Laws of war.38 the spirit behind these 
futuristic documents was to prevent the recurrence of mass atrocities reminiscent 
of world war ii.39 From another perspective, some scholars argue this legal change 
obligated third parties to avert genocide and other mass forms of mass atrocities.40 
the previous regime placed no legal obligation on foreign states to intervene during 
such scenarios thereby opening the leeway for autocrats to commit mass atrocities 
against helpless civilians the most striking example being the holocaust.41 
in spite of this transformative concrete framework and institutions there was 
a resurgence of incursions and barbarism as several uN members flouted the charter 
in pursuit of their geopolitical interests. A case in point was the Belgian invasion of 
the republic of Congo (kinshasa) after the secession of the mineral rich katanga 
region.42 At face value Belgium justified its decision as means of preventing the 
ethnic cleansing and persecution of its civilians residing in katanga. however, this 
humanitarian measure morphed into a full blown civil war pitting the western 
backed katanga against the soviet supported African nationalist government led 
by Patrice Lumumba.43 thereafter, this trend was replicated in three countries; india 
(east Pakistan) in 1971, tanzania (uganda) in 1978 and vietnam (kampuchea) in 
35  richard B. Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15(2) McGill Law Journal 205, 208 (1969).
36  eugene v. rostow, The Legality of the International Use of Force by and from States, 10 yale Journal of 
international Law 286, 286 (1985).
37  ian hurd, The UN Security Council and the International Rule of Law, 7(3) Chinese Journal of international 
Politics 361 (2014).
38  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by resolution 
260 (iii) A of the united Nations General Assembly on 9 december 1948; Geneva Conventions of the 
Laws of war, 12 August 1949.
39  henry t. king Jr. et al., Origins of the Genocide Convention, 40(1) Case western reserve Journal of 
international Law 13, 17 (2007).
40  eyal Mayroz, The Legal Duty to “Prevent”: After the Onset of “Genocide,” 14(1) Journal of Genocide 
research 79, 81 (2012).
41  daniel Levy & Natan sznaider, The Institutionalization of Cosmopolitan Morality: The Holocaust and 
Human Rights, 3(2) Journal of human rights 143, 145 (2004).
42  Jonathan J. Cole, The Congo Question: Conflicting Visions of Independence, 43(1) emporia state research 
studies 26, 33 (2006).
43  Nicole hobbs, The UN and the Congo Crisis of 1960, harvey M. Applebaum ’59 Award, Paper 6 (2014).
JOSEPH LUTTA 11
1978 all of whom intended to oust callous regimes.44 to some degree these actions 
were reminiscent of hitler’s invasion of sudetenland in former Czechoslovakia and 
Poland under the pretext of liberating the ethnic Germans from persecution.45 this 
worrisome state of affairs prompted the famed international scholar thomas Franck 
to pose the serious question “who killed Article 2(4) of the uN Charter?”46 despite the 
perpetual discussion on this emotive subject the global community failed to reach 
a consensus on how to reconcile dynamics of international law with the demands of 
humanitarian protection thereby leaving a glaring lacuna on this subject matter.
1.2. Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention
the last decades of the 20th century are classified as one of the grotesque periods 
in human history.47 this description stems from the waves of civil wars and ethnic 
conflicts that engulfed the global south countries.48 this conundrum reached the 
climax after the rwandan genocide of 1994 and yugoslavian conflict that dominated 
the better part of this epoch.49 this worrisome trend prompted some western 
countries to lobby for the right to intervene during internal conflict as means of 
averting humanitarian crisis.50 in 1998 this humanitarian concern impelled NAtO 
unilaterally pierced the veil of sovereignty and launch a series of airstrikes against 
yugoslavia under the banner of “humanitarian intervention.” As david robertson 
notes humanitarian intervention is
a doctrine under which one or more state may take action inside the 
territory of another state in order to protect those who are experiencing serious 
human rights persecution, up to and including attempts at genocide.51
44  Nadia Banteka, Dangerous Liaisons: The Responsibility to Protect and a Reform of the U.N. Security Council, 
54 Columbia Journal of transnational Law 382 (2016).
45  ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100(1) American Journal of 
international Law 107, 113 (2006).
46  thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 
64(5) American Journal of international Law 809, 810 (1970).
47  Adam roberts, The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts, 6(11) duke 
Journal of Comparative & international Law 11, 41 (1995).
48  Andreas wenger & simon J.A. Mason, The Civilisation of Armed Conflict: Trends and Implications, 90(872) 
international review of the red Cross 835, 841 (2008).
49  Jane stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities after Conflict: What Impact on Building the Rule 
of Law?, 38 Georgetown Journal of international Law 251, 267 (2007).
50  dabiru sridhar Patnaik, International Law and Responsibility to Protect: South Asian Perspective, doshisha 
Global studies Journal 173, 176 (2013).
51  david robertson, A Dictionary of Human Rights 119 (2nd ed., London: europe Publications, 2004).
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despite the benevolent objectives behind the military campaign, this decision 
raised the critical issue of whether the NAtO was justified to use force against 
a sovereign state.52 Consequently, the aggrieved government of Federal republic of 
yugoslavia filed a memorial with the international Court of Justice (iCJ) against NAtO 
which states a case later known as Legality of Use of Force.53 the applicant applied for 
temporary halt of the airstrikes arguing they were illegal and calamitous under Art. 9 
of the Genocide Convention.54 in its cautious and one-dimensional verdict the court 
expressed “deep concerns” about the humanitarian tragedies in the region which 
raised “serious issues” of international law.
however, the thrust of the decision revolved around the preliminary objection 
raised by NAtO states which questioned the plaintiff’s legal standing. the majority 
judges argued serbia and Montenegro lacked the locus standi to lodge the matter 
since they failed to meet the threshold of a uN member state as envisaged in Art. 35 
of the iCJ Charter.55 ensuing from this substantive technicality the court resolved 
that the applicant lacked the capacity to institute the proceedings and their case 
was summarily dismissed. Nonetheless, the applicants had a strong case since 
Arts. 2(4) and 51 of the uN Charter proscribes the use of force beyond the purview 
of self-defense contrary to NAtO’s actions.56 Furthermore, the court failed to issue 
legal guidelines on foreign intervention thereby de-escalating the dire humanitarian 
situation in the region and did not restore certainty on this subject matter for 
posterity purposes.57 From another perspective, by failing to seal this legal lacuna 
the court opened the floodgates for individual member states to interpret the 
charter in accordance to their personal objectives.58 this legal quandary was exposed 
after the u.s. led invasion of iraq to depose iraqi strongman saddam hussein who 
was accused of possessing weapons of Mass destruction and sponsoring terrorist 
organisations including Al-Qaeda.59 this legal pitfall spurred the call to reform the 
52  daniel h. Joyner, The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Paradigm, 13 european 
Journal of international Law 597, 600 (2002).
53  Yugoslavia v. NATO, 1999 i.C.J. 916.
54  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by resolution 260 
(iii) A of the united Nations General Assembly on 9 december 1948.
55  Article 35(1) of the statute states that Courts shall be opened to the states to the present statute.
56  ian hurd, Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World, 25(3) ethics & 
international Affairs 293, 301 (2011).
57  Christine Gray, The Use and Abuse of the International Court of Justice: Cases Concerning the Use of Force 
after Nicaragua, 14(5) european Journal of international Law 867, 870 (2013).
58  Goodman 2006, at 108.
59  Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35(3) Cornell 
Journal of international Law 533, 540 (2012); Judith Miller, Comments on the Use of Force in Afghanistan, 
35(3) Cornell Journal of international Law 605, 605 (2012).
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doctrine of humanitarian intervention for being susceptible to manipulation by 
individual countries.60
1.3. The Right to Protect
this origin of this principle is attributed to the emphatic speech by former uN 
secretary General kofi Annan as published in the uN Millennium report of 2001.61 
he stated in part:
if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a rwanda, to a srebrenica – to gross 
and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our 
common humanity?62
secretary Annan’s concern exposed the inextricable conflict between sovereignty 
and the use of force in protecting fundamental rights and freedom.63 in hindsight, 
the framers of the uN Charter envisaged Arts. 2(4) and 51 as limiting the use of 
force to purposes of self-defense.64 therefore, expanding this scope to encompass 
humanitarian interventions would trigger a paradigmatic shift in the international 
legal order. in order to harmonise this process the uN convened an ad hoc committee 
on the international Commission on intervention and state sovereignty (iCiss). this 
committee was comprised of seasoned experts in international humanitarian law who 
prepared a report that recommended a novel doctrine called the “responsibility to 
Protect.”65 this proposal was deeply anchored in the laxity and reticence of the global 
community in addressing the genocides in former yugoslavia and rwanda.66
At a glance this r2P stands on three major pillars as tools of averting civilian 
atrocities during armed conflict.67 the first is the responsibility to prevent which entails 
60  Peter hilpold, Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need for a Legal Reappraisal?, 12(3) european 
Journal of international Law 437 (2001).
61  united Nations General Assembly, we the Peoples: the role of the united Nations in the twenty-First 
Century, report of the secretary-General, 27 March 2000 (Jun. 5, 2018), available at http://unpan1.
un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan000923.pdf.
62  Id. at 35, para. 217.
63  sandra Fabijanić Gagro, The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine, iii(1) international Journal of social 
sciences 61, 63 (2014).
64  Id. Arts. 2(4) and 51 of the uN Charter.
65  international Commission on intervention and state sovereignty, the responsibility to Protect, report 
(december 2001) (Jun. 5, 2018), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/iCiss%20report.pdf.
66  Alex J. Bellamy, Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World 
Summit, 20(2) ethics & international Affairs 143, 148 (2006).
67  Gabija Grigaitė, Responsibility to Protect Concept and Conflict in International Law, 83 teise 174, 177 (2012).
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tackling the root causes that may culminate in internal conflict.68 this requirement 
intends to strike a balance between state sovereignty and humanitarian concerns 
by engaging the relevant stakeholders in redressing the dispute. this mechanism 
intended to cure the shortcoming of humanitarian intervention which solely relied 
on the unilateral use of force in redressing gross human rights abuses. Conversely, 
the responsibility to react empowers countries to respond to humanitarian concerns 
through various means including sanctions, international prosecution but resorting 
to military intervention only as the last option.69 this proposal intended to offer 
viable options other than force in resolving armed conflict. Finally, the responsibility 
to rebuild underscores the duty to reconstruct countries torn apart by armed conflict 
through infrastructural development and post-conflict reconciliation.70
in addition to these principal obligations r2P stands on precautionary principles 
on the use of force. ramesh thakur one of the foremost authorities in this subject 
and an iCiss committee member explains the use of force should be the last resort 
and not the tool of choice when confronting human rights atrocities.71 therefore, 
these supplementary principles intend to protect the sanctity and integrity of r2P as 
a benign remedy to armed conflict. First is right intention principle which stipulates the 
primary obligation of the intervening state is to halt human suffering. second is the last 
resort principle which limits the use of military force as the measure of last resort. the 
third principle of proportional force prescribes the proportionate force at par with the 
nature and degree of the conflict. Finally, reasonable prospects principle which provides 
there for a proper assessment on the use of force to ensure that the consequences of 
the action does not outweigh the ultimate consequences of inaction.72 the commission 
further recommended the permanent members of the security Council to craft the 
guidelines of enforcing the doctrine.73 this resolution was subsequently adopted at the 
uN summit in 2005 but the divided security Council failed to delineate the concrete 
boundaries on the implementation of the principle.74 
Noteworthy, r2P is distinguishable from humanitarian intervention since its 
overarching objective is to protect civilians vulnerable to the atrocities of armed conflict 
68 Grigaitė 2012.
69  Id.
70  Id.
71  ramesh thakur, R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers, 36(2) washington Quarterly 
61, 73 (2013).
72  Mitsuhisa Fukutomi, Humanitarian Intervention in Libya: Is It Causing Internal War?, 45(2) hitotsubashi 
Journal of Law and Politics 23, 26 (2017).
73  herbert hirsch, The Responsibility to Protect and Preventing Genocide in the Twenty-First Century, 1(2) 
Journal of African Conflicts and Peace studies 68, 73 (2009).
74  scott straus, Rwanda and Darfur: A Comparative Analysis, 1(1) Genocide studies and Prevention: An 
international Journal 41, 44 (2006).
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rather than the determining the rights of intervening states.75 Furthermore, r2P utilises 
a spectrum of mechanisms to redress conflict with the use of force being the last resort. 
in contradistinction humanitarian intervention gives utmost priority to using force in 
resolving gross violation of human rights.76 Finally, ramesh thakur differentiates r2P 
from humanitarian intervention since it requires approval from the uN compared to 
the latter which is prone to unilateral initiative by the intervening country.77
despite these changes there is legitimate concern the security Council may 
improvise the r2P doctrine into a tool for condemning weaker nations especially 
in the global south to the international Criminal Court (iCC).78 secondly, the Libyan 
intervention demonstrated this doctrine may give preference to regime change 
rather to humanitarian concerns after NAtO instigated the downfall of Colonel 
Muammar Gaddafi.79 this myopic and messy approach to the conflict left behind 
a failed state embroiled in sectarian violence, terrorist insurgency and human 
trafficking.80 this failed Libyan experiment cast serious aspersions on this principle as 
budding concept in international humanitarian law thereby inhibiting its application 
in other jurisdictions like syria.81 despite the obvious challenges the adoption of r2P 
played a significant role in charting the course towards redressing gross violation of 
human rights violation during armed conflict.
2. The Syrian Conflict
2.1. Brief History of Syria
the origin of the modern syrian state is broadly traced to the great Ottoman 
empire that spanned across the entire Middle east region.82 After the defeat during 
75  eve Massingham, Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes: Does the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine Advance the Legality of the Use of Force for Humanitarian Ends?, 91(876) international review 
of the red Cross 803, 815 (2009).
76  karina sangha, The Responsibility to Protect: A Cosmopolitan Argument for the Duty of Humanitarian 
Intervention, expressions: the Journal of the Canadian Political science students’ Association (2012), 
at 2 (Jun. 5, 2018), available at http://web.uvic.ca/~cpssa/articles/2012winter001.pdf.
77  ramesh thakur, The Responsibility to Protect at 15, 92(2) international Affairs 415, 418 (2016).
78  kirsten Ainley, The Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal Court: Counteracting the Crisis, 
91(1) international Affairs 37, 41 (2015).
79  Jeffrey Bachman, R2P’s “Ulterior Motive Exemption” and the Failure to Protect in Libya, 3(4) Politics and 
Governance 56, 60 (2015).
80  emin Poljarevic, Libya: A Case Study of a Failed Revolution, 2nd international Conference on social 
sciences, 2–3 April 2016, istanbul, turkey, at 73, 75.
81  rafał tarnogórski, Libya and Syria: Responsibility to Protect at a Crossroads, 26 the Polish institute of 
international Affairs 1, 4 (2012).
82  American society of international Law, French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, 17(3) American Journal 
of international Law 177, 177 (1923).
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world war i this vast empire collapsed and the League of Nations granted France the 
mandate rule over the syrian territory.83 this imperialist ruling ignited the nationalist 
armed struggle which led to independence in April 1946.84 Nonetheless, this autonomy 
was momentary since the country was beset with both internal and external conflicts. 
domestically, the ruling Arab socialist Baath regime began crumbling under the 
weight of political infighting leading to a string coups and countercoups that 
ultimately propelled the Minister of defense hafez al-Assad into power.85 despite 
being an Alawite minority hafez built an omnipotent political dynasty that dominated 
the country for decades.86 externally, the country was entangled in endless and 
volatile conflicts with its arch-nemesis israel, a position which was aggravated by 
the humiliating defeat during the six day war.87 however, Assad redeemed his image 
when the Arabs triumphed during the yom kippur war by forcing israel to cede the 
sinai Peninsula to egypt and thereafter peace accords at Camp david.88
despite these challenges hafez cemented his iron fisted rule for 29 years until his 
death in 2000 when he was succeeded by his son Bashar. the introverted western 
oriented ophthalmologist became the polished image of a modern and reformed 
syria compared to his abrasive ultra conservative father.89 during his first term he 
embarked on ambitious reforms including liberalising the economy, secularising 
the country and releasing political prisoners.90 Nonetheless, these changes did not 
appease some factions leading to the resurgence of political dissidence supported 
by the western countries.91 Noteworthy, the demographics of syria is that of 
a predominantly sunni Muslim country with significant pockets of shiite, Christian 
83  Ayse tekdal Fildis, The Troubles in Syria: Spawned by French Divide and Rule, 18(4) Middle east Policy 
Council 129, 130 (2011).
84  Amanda Pitrof, Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen: Examining the Major Obstacles to Achieving Peace in 
Syria’s Civil War, 15(1) Pepperdine dispute resolution Law Journal 157, 160 (2015).
85  Malcolm h. kerr, Hafiz Asad and the Changing Patterns of Syrian Politics, 28(4) international Journal 
689, 701 (1973).
86  uğur Ümit Üngör, Mass Violence in Syria: A Preliminary Analysis, 3 New Middle eastern studies 1, 3 (2013).
87  kardo karim rached Mohammad, The Six-Day War and Its Impact on Arab and Israeli Conflict, 7(2) 
history research 90, 91 (2007).
88  Louis kriesberg, Negotiating the Partition of Palestine and Evolving Israeli-Palestinian Relations, 7(1) 
Brown Journal of world Affairs 63, 68 (2000).
89  Najib Ghadbian, The New Asad: Dynamics of Continuity and Change in Syria, 55(4) Middle east Journal 
624, 626 (2001).
90  Louise Arimatsu & Mohbuba Choudhury, The Legal Classification of the Armed Conflicts in Syria, Yemen 
and Libya, Chatham house (March 2014) (Jun. 5, 2018), available at https://www.chathamhouse.org/
sites/default/files/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/20140300ClassificationConflictsA
rimatsuChoudhury1.pdf.
91  Jānis Bērziņš, Civil War in Syria: Origins, Dynamics, and Possible Solutions, National defence Academy 
of Latvia Center for security and strategic research (August 2013) (Jun. 5, 2018), available at https://
ru.scribd.com/document/277150579/Berzins-pdf.
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and Alawite populations.92 despite this cultural and religious admixture the country 
managed to surmount the sectarian aggression and remained relatively peaceful 
compared to its neighbours.
2.2. Origins of the Syrian Civil War
On 17 december 2010 Mohamed Bouazizi young tunisian street vendor self-
immolated in defiance of the rampant corruption and repression that bedeviled the 
country.93 what began as personal protest sparked off a radical wave of revolution 
that forced the long time tunisian autocrat Ben Ali to cede power and seek exile 
in saudi Arabia.94 this movement later spread like wild fires across the entire 
Middle east region, leading to the downfall of long term rulers in egypt, Libya and 
yemen.95 in the syrian context the trigger cause of the demonstrations is fraught 
with speculation and conspiracy theories. however, it is alleged the protests began 
after a group of juveniles’ scrawled anti-government graffiti in the town of daraa.96 
Another viewpoint argues the uprising was caused by a combination of sectarian 
violence and religious extremism fuelled by external forces.97 Gradually, the clash 
between security forces and the demonstrators exploded into a full blown civil war 
that left close to 100,000 people dead and millions displaced with most of them 
migrating to europe.98 
By and large, the western nations blamed President Assad for the atrocities while 
russia, China and iran remained highly skeptical of this sweeping indictment.99 
this platitude hit a peak in March 2013 after a chemical gas attack in southern 
town of khan al-Assal which left 25 dead and scores injured. the regime denied 
these allegations since it had submitted a comprehensive report to the uN 
92  esther van eijk, Pluralistic Family Law in Syria: Blane or Blessing?, 2 electronic Journal of islamic and 
Middle eastern Law 73, 73 (2014).
93  Matt J. duffy, Arab Media Regulations: Identifying Restraints on Freedom of the Press in the Laws of Six 
Arabian Peninsula Countries, 6 Berkeley Journal of Middle eastern and islamic Law 1, 1 (2014).
94  Zoltan Barany, Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military, 22(4) Journal of democracy 28, 
28 (2011).
95  Jordan J. Paust, International Law, Dignity, Democracy and Arab Spring, 46(1) Cornell Journal of 
international Law 1, 5 (2013).
96  Patrick B. Grant, Islamic Law, International Law, and Non-International Armed Conflict in Syria, 35 Boston 
university international Law Journal 1, 4 (2017).
97  Artur Malantowicz, Civil War in Syria and the ‘New Wars’ Debate, 5(3) Amsterdam Law Forum 52, 55 
(2013).
98  Joseph klinger, Counterintervention on Behalf of the Syrian Opposition? An Illustration of the Need for 
Greater Clarity in the Law, 55(2) harvard Journal of international Law 483, 484 (2012).
99  human rights Council, report of the independent international Commission of inquiry on the syrian 
Arab republic, 4 June 2013 (Jun. 5, 2018), available at http://www.ohchr.org/documents/hrBodies/
hrCouncil/Coisyria/A-hrC-23-58_en.pdf.
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denying possession of any chemical weapons.100 Furthermore, the uN prepared 
a comprehensive investigation report which confirmed the use of the chemical 
weapons but could not determine the perpetrator.101 this incident was followed by 
a series recurrent gas attacks scattered across the country which led to the uk and 
France attributed to the regime.102 this prompted President Obama to issue stern 
warning to the syrian government of “dire consequences” should it “cross the line.”103 
Conversely, russian leader vladimir Putin adopted a more objective and cautious 
approach by demanding independent and credible investigations by the uN into the 
alleged incidents.104 this back and forth failed to avert the conflict which continued 
to claim more civilian casualties thereby prompting the human rights Council to 
classify the situation as “non-international armed conflict.”105
2.3. Non-State Parties to the Syrian Conflict
2.3.1. The Syrian Rebel Movement/Free Syrian Movement
this resistance comprises of several anti-Assad movements supported by 
countries from the west and Middle east. the major groups include the National 
Coordination Committee (NCC) and the syrian National Council (sNC). the former 
is a secular and political movement seeking democratic reforms while the latter is 
affiliated with the Muslim brotherhood and is more militant in nature.106 this insurgent 
movement is buttressed by the “white helmet paramilitary” which comprises of 
mercenaries funded by NAtO, turkey and saudi Arabia.107 this movement merged 
100  united Nations security Council, Note verbale dated 7 November 2005 from the Permanent Mission 
of the syrian Arab republic to the united Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee, 
10 November 2005 (Jun. 5, 2018), available at http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/23813/s_
AC.44_2004_(02)_70_Add.3-eN.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y.
101  Petra Perišić, Implications of the Conflicts in Libya and Syria for the “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine, 
67(5) Zbornik PFZ 783, 799 (2017).
102  rené Pita & Juan domingo, The Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Conflict, 2 toxic 391, 393 
(2014).
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61 uCLA Law review 244, 245 (2013).
104  Ole solvang, Putin Calls for Investigations of Chemical Attack in Syria, human rights watch, 11 April 
2017 (Jun. 5, 2018), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/11/putin-calls-investigations-
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105  human rights Council, report of the independent international Commission of inquiry on the 
syrian Arab republic, 16 August 2012, para. 143 (Jun. 5, 2018), available at http://www.ohchr.org/
documents/hrBodies/hrCouncil/regularsession/session21/A-hrC-21-50_en.pdf.
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Dynamics, 8(1) Journal of turkish world studies 55, 58 (2013).
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into a formidable rebellion that launched a series of brutal attacks on both security 
forces and pro-regime civilians. For instance in 2014 the rebels shelled the pro-
regime neighbourhood of Mahatta in daraa killing dozens of unarmed civilians.108
2.3.1.1. Legal implication of the syrian rebel Movement
despite the possible culpability on both sides western countries and human 
rights organisation have swiftly and repeatedly condemned the Assad regime for 
the atrocities while overlooking the actions of rebels.109 A case in point is a human 
rights council report accused the regime of summary execution, torture and illegal 
detention despite the situation being classified as armed conflict.110 in Prosecutor v. 
Dusko Tadic the international Criminal tribunal on former yugoslavia (iCty) stated:
An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organised armed groups or between such groups within a state.111
this implication of this conclusion means the parties to the conflict including the 
rebels are bound by humanitarian obligations as underscored in common Art. 3 of 
the Geneva conventions.112 As Antonio Cassese notes the spirit behind the protocol is 
protecting the unarmed civilian population (non-combatants) from the atrocities of 
internal armed conflict by holding the participants accountable for their actions.113 
Moreover, this obligation to avert the atrocities is non-derogable irrespective of 
whether the parties are non-signatories to the relevant conventions.114 this holding 
was amplified in the Tadic case where the appellate chamber of the iCty stated:
…an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
108  kheder khaddour, The Assad Regime’s Hold on the Syrian State, Carnegie Middle east Center (July 2015) 
(Jun. 5, 2018), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/syrian_state1.pdf.
109  Leila Nadya sadat, Genocide in Syria: International Legal Options, International Legal Limits, and the 
Serious Problem of Political Will, 5 impunity watch Law Journal 1, 1 (2015).
110  human rights Council, report of the human rights Council on its seventeenth special session, 
22 August 2011 (Jun. 5, 2018), available at http://www.ohchr.org/documents/hrBodies/hrCouncil/
Coisyria/ress17_1.pdf.
111  Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic aka “Dule” (Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction), it-94-1, international Criminal tribunal for the former yugoslavia (iCty), 2 October 
1995, para. 96.
112  Id.
113  Antonio Cassese, The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and 
Customary International Law, 3 uCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 55, 86 (1984).
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organized armed groups or between such groups within a state… international 
humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring states 
or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of 
a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.115
similar sentiments were later echoed in Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman of where 
the appeals chamber of the special Court for sierra Leone stated:
it is well settled that all parties to an armed conflict, whether states or 
non-state actors are bound by international humanitarian law, even though 
only states may become parties to international treaties.116
in the view of the foregoing legal principles the syrian rebels are equally culpable 
for the atrocities committed during the course of the conflict.
2.3.2. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/ISIS/Islamic State/Daesh
the islamic state is a sadistic and ultra-fundamentalist group that intends to 
establish a salafist caliphate across the region. A comprehensive study carried out 
by the Brookings institution indicates the is is a caricature mini-state complete with 
rules and regulations defined by hard line Shariah law.117 these archaic norms are built 
upon capital and corporal punishments which forced a majority of the civilians to flee 
northwards. Furthermore it is driven by gross misogyny that proscribes women from 
economic participation through destruction of businesses, markets and farms.118
its’ origin is attributed to the rogue Jordanian Mujahideen Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
who commanded the Al-Qaeda faction in iraq.119 After a string of guerilla and suicide 
bomb attacks on the u.s. and iraqi forces he merged the group together with other 
insurgencies to form the islamic state of iraq (isi). After Zarqawi was killed by a u.s. 
airstrike in 2006 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi assumed leadership of the group.120 the fiery 
115  Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 111, para. 70.
116  Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman (Case No. sCsL-2004-14-Ar72(e)), decision on preliminary Motion 
Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child recruitment), 31 May 2004, para. 22.
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and eloquent cleric used his sublime oratory skills to recruit volunteers from across 
the world thereby creating a large militia which ultimately conquered the city of 
Mosul.121 this expansion was subsequently aggravated by the Arab spring which 
left a significant power vacuum for encroachment into egypt, Libya and yemen.122 
After the syrian crisis, it operated through an affiliate organisation called “Al-Nusra 
Front” which later merged with isi to form the islamic state of iraq and syria (isis).123 
it is widely believed due to its’ sunni underpinnings isis wanted to use syria as the 
platform for penetrating the impregnable shiite crescent of Lebanon and iran.124
Apart from the ultra-religious fanaticism, isis is feared for its signature medieval 
barbarism which includes suicide bombings, beheading of infidels, enslaving women, 
public execution of sexual minorities and forceful conscription of child soldiers. the 
group is also blamed for the rape, enslavement, trafficking and honour killings of 
yazidi women and girls who are derided as unclean and sub-human.125 surprisingly, 
the sinister and callous insurgent group continues to attract young volunteer fighters 
from across the world with most of them coming from western europe and Australia.126 
this international recruitment stands on the anti-western sentiments that engulfed 
the region after the u.s. led invasion of Afghanistan and iraq.127 under the command 
of Baghdadi daesh unleashed brutal attacks on both the syrian army and civilians 
through suicide bombings and beheading of the state soldiers.
2.4. The Right to Protect and the Syrian Conflict
the syrian conflict presented a tough and awkward situation for the uN to 
implement the right of protect. Firstly, the contentious Libyan intervention had sullied 
the status of this doctrine after NAtO clamoured for the downfall and execution of 
Muammar Gaddafi.128 this discrepancy culminated into mounting skepticism against 
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this doctrine which was perceived as a travesty for regime change.129 Furthermore, 
there was profound optimism post-Gaddafi Libya would evolve in the beacon of 
liberal democracy in the Arab world. however, this optimism turned ominous after 
the country disintegrated into a dystopian state haunted by terrorist insurgency, 
sectarian violence and human trafficking.130 
subsequently, when the security Council debated the resolution to intervene in 
syria, russia and China voted against the suggestion for fear of replicating the Libyan 
failure in the Middle east. these divergent viewpoints split the council right down the 
middle pitting the usA, France and uk supporting the rebel movement while russia 
and China affirming their support for the regime.131 the latter states advocated for 
political and diplomatic solution that included President Assad being a legitimate 
stakeholder. they further argued military intervention would be analogous to 
infringing upon the sovereignty and domestic issues of syria.132 however, after 
the terrorist attack in Paris, France on 13 November 2015 the uN security Council 
passed a resolution calling on the member states to take all necessary measures 
to avert future attacks by the islamic state.133 this resolution known as “necessary 
measures” offered the council the wide latitude to use force against isis which posed 
an existential threat to global peace and stability.134 however, since there was no 
consensus among the members of the security Council, each faction decided to 
tackle the problem in a manner that befitted their agenda.
3. The Russian Intervention in Syria
3.1. Brief Background of President Vladimir Putin’s Ascension to Power
President vladimir Putin is one of the most enigmatic and dominant figure in 
contemporary global politics. the tough talking judo sensei began his career as 
a kGB agent stationed in dresden, east Germany during the Cold war. After the 
collapse of the soviet union he meandered his way through local politics rising to 
the level of deputy Mayor of his native city of st. Petersburg. in 1998 his political 
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career took a giant leap after he was appointed to head the russian intelligence, then 
renamed Federal security service of the russian Federation (FsB).135 this position 
granted him leverage to forge strategic political networks that propelled him to the 
Premiership in August 1999 after the aging and ailing yeltsin anointed him as his 
successor. this political change offered russia the perfect window of opportunity to 
reclaim its international image in a unipolar world controlled by the usA. the yeltsin 
rapprochement with west had sacrificed at considerable expense russia’s national 
pride and hegemony.136 For example he abandoned the “parity doctrine” which 
forced russia to relinquish its nuclear rearmament ambition of being at par with the 
Americans. Furthermore, his ambition to remodel the economy around the western 
oriented free market system aggrieved both the nationalist and communist who 
lampooned him as the “America’s yes man.”137 At the turn of the millennium yeltsin 
resigned as President thereby paving way for Putin’s leadership which intended to 
build russia’s image on the geopolitical platform.138
3.2. Russia and Military Intervention
After world war ii the soviet union became one of the permanent members 
of the uN security Council. After the disintegration of the soviet union in 1991, 
russia inherited the soviet seat in the security Council with Boris yeltsin elected 
President.139 Although yeltsin was ambivalent towards reinstating the russian 
geopolitical dominance, his successor was determined to forge strategic alliances 
with several countries in eastern europe, Asia and south America. upon embarking 
on this volatile mission Putin found himself ensnared in a geopolitical impasse 
with NAtO. this military organisation was aggressively expanding eastwards after 
engulfing significant portions of eastern european countries including Poland, 
hungary and Czech republic.140 this global confrontation hit a peak after russia’s 
unilateral military intervention in Georgia in support of the renegade regions of 
south Ossetia and Abkhazia.141 the west assailed russia for violating its’ international 
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law obligation by invading and occupying a foreign sovereign state. More specifically, 
the western countries read mischief in russia’s “peacekeeping efforts” after it 
supported the minority Abkhaz resistance against the Georgian army.142 Nonetheless, 
the deployment of russian forces in the region was well within the international 
legal order as it was strictly restricted within the disputed regions. Furthermore, 
the Georgian intervention was the final resort after russia had relentlessly tried to 
engage all stakeholders in resolving the dispute diplomatically.143
this geopolitical antagonism was exacerbated in 2013 after the Crimean 
region of ukraine held a referendum and unanimously voted to join the russian 
Federation.144 however, the west ignored the underlying self-determination concern 
and viewed it as russia’ annexation of ukraine.145 this prompted President Obama 
and other western countries to impose the disingenuous sanctions against russia as 
countermeasure the Crimean “annexation.”146 in 2014, the former American secretary 
of defense robert Gates labeled Putin the biggest threat to global stability who 
was determined to avenge the west for the collapse of soviet union.147 he then 
proposed a continuum of stringent measures to constrain this objective including 
substituting russia as the biggest supplier of oil and gas in western europe.148 despite 
the countervailing opposition from the NAtO Putin’s leadership has reinstated russia 
as a force to reckon in the geopolitical landscape.149
3.3. Russia and Syrian Intervention
the warm relationship between russia and syrian goes back to the Cold war era 
when the soviet union supported syria during its perennial conflicts with israel.150 
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with regards to the present conflict Moscow defended the Assad government 
arguing it was using proportionate force against armed militants targeting both 
civilians and public infrastructure.151 Furthermore, russia was averse to any form of 
regime change arguing President Assad was the legitimate leader of the country.152 
this affirmation intended to avert the likelihood of replicate another Libya where 
NAtO used r2P as the perfect vehicle for regime change.153 Consequently, the 
russian mission to the uN successfully vetoed a series of resolutions that intimated 
military intervention in syria.154 A majority of these resolutions were geared towards 
punishing the government while conveniently overlooking the atrocities committed 
by the various rebel splinter groups.155
in 2015 President Assad requested russian military and financial assistance in 
counteracting the incursion by domestic and foreign parties.156 this military intervention 
was three dimensional in nature by pooling together air strikes, naval support in tartus 
and reinforcing the Arab syrian army with russian ground troops.157 the russian military 
campaign became a success after aiding the regime in reclaiming the southern city of 
Aleppo from isis and rebels.158 in this case the russian intervention fits neatly within 
the overall objectives of the right to Protect. in terms of Pillar 1 russia was firmly 
committed to addressing the root causes of the conflict by proposing a round table 
discussion among the various parties. this mechanism would have addressed the 
root causes of the conflict thereby curtailing the situation from culminating into a full 
blown civil war. however, due to the hard stance adopted by the west it was virtually 
implausible for parties to attempt this any reconciliation which led to other means 
including the use of force. Conversely, Pillar 2 demands capacity building as a means 
of deescalating the gross violation of human rights.159 this stipulates the domestic 
151  Garwood-Gowers 2013, at 600.
152  Nathalie tocci, Europe, the United States and Global Human Rights Governance: The Responsibility to Protect 
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government should be supported to the point of assuming control whereupon those 
responsible for the atrocities should be held culpable.160 Furthermore, this obligation 
demands spontaneous reaction to emancipate civilians from the atrocities of armed 
conflict. By supporting the syrian government russia bolstered the fight against isis 
and other radical groups responsible for the atrocities in the conflict thereby restoring 
normalcy in the country.161 Pillar three entails the implementation of post-conflict 
reconstruction and reconciliation as means of restoring rule of law and normalcy after 
the conflict. President Putin has taken the personal initiative of mediating peace talks 
among the various warring factions as means of restoring peace and stability in the 
fractured country. however, there is legitimate concern his impartiality and objectivity 
may be clouded because of his close proximity to President Assad.162 in spite of these 
concerns President Putin has reiterated his support for tripartite peace talks overseen 
by a third party including the uN.163 
in the same vein, russia’s “invited intervention” respects syria’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity since it acted at the behest of the legitimate government.164 this point 
is anchored on the fact that President Assad being the legitimate authority of the country 
should be supported in his quest to restore order. According to Jean d’Aspremont in 
his paper “Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of democracy” the legality of any 
government is determined from both internal and external perspectives.165 internal factor 
imply the regime is duly recognised by the majority of the people who comply with its 
public policies and laws. Furthermore, a normative interpretation of this concept implies 
the ruler has the power to impose sanction on the norms and behavior of the subjects 
within its territories.166 Conversely, the litmus test for determining external recognition 
is how the regime relates with the governments of other countries. in superimposing 
this school of thought in the syrian context, it is cogent to argue President Assad is 
160  Alise Coen, R2P, Global Governance, and the Syrian Refugee Crisis, 19(8) international Journal of human 
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the legitimate leader. this is because he enjoys the unwavering support of the syrian 
people especially after his re-election in 2004 compared to the rebels and the islamic 
state who are relegated to their controlled territories. internationally, President Assad is 
widely regarded as the leader of the country by both his allies and adversaries. in light 
of the foregoing legal principles russia intervention cannot be classified as illegal use 
of force against a sovereign state.
4. Legal Consequences of Western Intervention in Syria
4.1. The Concern about Aggression and State Sovereignty
the russian intervention in syria has been opposed especially the western countries 
who are determined to topple the Assad regime. however, a cursory glance of the 
NAtO led mission in syria demonstrates a false moral equivalence between Assad 
and isis as equal perpetrators of the conflict. this erroneous approach has prompted 
the west to support the rebels as the means of toppling the regime. however, this 
approach is tantamount to form of aggression against the sovereignty and integrity of 
the syria. in his opening address before the Nuremberg tribunal, former u.s. Attorney 
General and supreme Court Judge robert h. Jackson defined aggression to include:
Provision of support to armed bands formed in the territory of another 
state, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to take in 
its own territory measures in its power to deprive those bands all assistance 
or protection.167
secondly, supporting the rebel movement instead of the regime is antithetical 
to the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity under international law. As 
Olivier Corten and vaios koutroulis note there is no general rule in international law 
that permits any state to support rebels in overthrowing a government, even if it is 
responsible for gross violation of human rights.168 the Assad regime is the legitimate 
government of syria which pursuant to the uN Charter can only be attacked for 
purpose of self-defense purposes. this position is echoed by the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States which stipulates:
No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, 
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state… 
167  Christi scott Bartman, Lawfare and the Definition of Aggression: What the Soviet Union and Russian 
Federation Can Teach Us, 43(1) Case western reserve Journal of international Law 423, 425 (2010).
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No state shall organise, assist, foment, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist 
or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime 
of another state, or interfere in the civil strife in another state… every state 
has the inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural 
systems, without interference in any form by another state…169
in extrapolating this point to the r2P hideo yamagata observes it granted foreign 
states the power to support the host state in protecting the populace within its’ 
territories unless there is compelling evidence of gross laxity or complicity to the 
atrocities.170 in this case the lack of persuasive evidence of syrian government being 
complicit to the atrocities implies the intervening state has the duty to respect and 
preserve the sovereignty of host country.
By the same token the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity were 
well enunciated by the iCJ in Nicaragua v. USA.171 in this case the socialist sandinista 
government of Nicaragua accused the usA of supporting and training renegade 
groups of right wing paramilitaries based in honduras called the contras. these 
groups launched systematic campaigns of civilian terror which caused widespread 
carnage and displacement. it was later alleged the contras had committed numerous 
atrocities including rape, torture, assassinations, civilian executions and displacement 
against perceived sandinista sympathisers. subsequently, Nicaragua argued by 
providing material and financial support to the contras, usA should be held liable 
for the atrocities. however, the u.s. raised a preliminary objection challenging the 
authority of the iCJ to adjudicate the matter. it argued the 1946 declaration of 
consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the court could not apply to the court.172 
Nonetheless, the court dismissed the objection arguing Art. 36(5) of the statute 
clothed it with the unfettered jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.173
subsequently, the critical issue was whether by funding of the contras the united 
states had violated customary international law obligation to respect the domestic 
169  united Nations General Assembly, declaration on Principles of international Law concerning Friendly 
relations and Co-operation among states in accordance with the Charter of the united Nations, 
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affairs of Nicaragua. the court responded in the affirmative by holding the usA 
responsible for interfering in the internal affairs of Nicaragua contrary to the uN 
Charter. the court went ahead and compartmentalised the nature of infringement 
into direct control and indirect control. Direct control applies the groups which are 
funded and controlled by a foreign state while indirect control pertains to groups 
that exercise a degree of autonomy. in the latter phase there must be sufficient 
evidence to prove the controlling state was in control and aware of the operations 
that culminated into the offences. in this case the contras fell within the second 
group and the usA could not be held culpable for their actions since it did not control 
their activities. By adopting this complex reasoning the court invoked such high 
standards that insulated the funding state from criminal liability of supporting armed 
movements in foreign jurisdictions. the usA being the commanding organ ought to 
have anticipated the likelihood of the contras using the funds, artilleries and tactics 
to commit atrocities against innocent Nicaraguans. in light of this verdict, there is 
an inextricable connection between the use of force and the doctrine of r2P since 
it defines the parameters of military purpose strictly for protecting the civilians.174 
however, if this sacrosanct objective is substituted with regime change then it 
nullifies the humanitarian purpose thereby necessitating from criminal sanctions.
in the Oil Platforms case the islamic republic of iran sued the united states 
for breach of sovereignty and freedom of commerce after the bombing its oil 
platforms near the coast of Bahrain.175 the u.s. argued self-defense under Art. 51 
of the uN Charter after two of its merchant vessels were allegedly sunk by iranian 
firepower within the vicinity of the Bahraini coast. the court held the u.s. reaction 
was unjustified since it failed to meet the threshold of necessity or self-defense 
under international law. however, the action did not amount to breach of freedom 
of commerce due to the inanimate existence of commercial relationship between 
the two countries which negated the claim for reparations.176
this legal issue resurfaced in the Armed Activities case where the democratic 
republic of Congo (drC) lodged a memorial against uganda.177 the gravamen of 
this dispute began when President Laurent desire kabila issued a moratorium 
demanding uganda and rwanda to withdraw all their troops stationed in the eastern 
border town of Goma. in retrospect, the latter two countries supported his armed 
struggle that led to the overthrow of longtime kleptocrat President Mobutu sese 
174  Marcelo kohen, The Principle of Non-Intervention 25 Years after the Nicaragua Judgment, 25(1) Leiden 
Journal of international Law 157, 160 (2012).
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seko in 1997. Nonetheless, uganda defied this directive and deployed its troops to 
the western town of kitona then controlled by the anti-government MLC armed 
rebels. the drC further alleged uganda offered substantial material and military 
support to these insurgents who launched a string of armed operations seeking to 
overthrow the kabila government. 
this sudden change in loyalty and friendship forced President kabila to solicit 
for military aid from his southern allies Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia whose swift 
onslaught quelled the rebellion and restored temporary normalcy in the country. 
After several peace talks and agreements the two countries reached a ceasefire and 
in 2003 uganda agreed to withdraw its troops from the Congo.178 despite this accord 
the drC alleged uganda left behind “a complex network of warlords” along the 
border region of ituri which orchestrated military incursions and plundering of the 
vast mineral wealth.179 it further averred these military actions amounted belligerent 
occupation and infringement upon its territorial integrity as envisaged by Arts. 2(4) 
and 51 of the uN Charter.
in response, uganda leveled similar accusation against the drC after state forces 
stormed its embassy in kinshasa, harassed the diplomatic staff and confiscated their 
personal belongings. uganda argued these actions were undertaken in flippant 
disregard of various provisions of the vienna Convention on diplomatic relations of 
1961.180 in the verdict, the majority of the judges held that uganda’s military activities in 
the drC contravened Art. 2(4) of the uN Charter.181 Conversely, uganda’s counterclaim 
for self-defense was dismissed since the framers of the Charter never envisaged the 
applicability of Art. 51 after the occurrence of an armed attack. Furthermore, uganda 
failed to tender sufficient evidence of the legal and factual circumstances that would 
have warranted armed intervention.182 By and large, the common thread of reasoning 
that runs through these landmark decisions is that customary international law 
prohibits the disproportionate use of force against a sovereign state except during 
self-defense. therefore, a similar argument can be raised against the inordinate use 
of force by NAtO states against syrian government.
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4.2. Belligerent Occupation
it would be prudent to delve deeper into the issue of belligerent occupation of 
foreign territories since it introduces new dimension to the concept of sovereignty. 
this amorphous term describes the illegal use of military force to invade and occupy 
foreign territory.183 As Faustin Ntoubandi notes the legal principles pertaining to this 
subject matter are enunciated in rules 42–56 of the hague rules184 and Arts. 27–36 
and 47–78 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions,185 general principles of international 
law and customary international law.186 Generally speaking if the host government 
grants consent to foreign troops within its territories there is no international armed 
conflict hence it cannot be classified as “belligerent occupation.”
this legal quandary was expounded by the iCJ in the Legal Consequences of 
Wall Case. the cardinal issue was whether israel was justified to erect walls and 
barricades in occupied Palestinian territories.187 the court admitted israel by 
virtue of its founding in 1948 was not a signatory to the hague rules and Geneva 
Convention.188 Nonetheless, international law had undergone a paradigmatic change 
that chrystallised these principles into customary international law which bound 
the parties to the dispute.189 the court further held that israel had infringed upon 
the Palestinian territory by building the wall in the occupied regions of west Bank 
and Gaza strip which prohibited the movement of Palestinian settlers.190 in light of 
this cogent verdict it is fair to surmise that any form of unwarranted occupation 
that inhibits the civilian population is tantamount to infringement of territory. the 
benchmark in determining is whether the occupation changes sovereignty but 
whether it interferes with the effective control of the country.191
in the Armed Conflict case it was held that the fact that uganda had stationed 
its troops in the eastern region of the drC amounted to belligerent occupation.192 
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unlike the Nicaragua decision, there was profound optimism this judgement would 
encourage state parties to engage in diplomatic dispute resolution mechanism rather 
than armed conflict for fear legal repercussions like uganda.193 similar obligation 
extends to the r2P whose principle objective is to safeguard the human rights during 
armed conflict. however, if any country not permitted by syria deploys troops or 
supports resistance intending to overthrow the Assad regime would be culpable of 
“belligerent occupation.” the principle requirement for this doctrine is the presence 
of troops on foreign soil and the ability of an occupying power to exert its authority 
over their activities.
4.3. Negligent Support of Rebels
By funding the armed rebels in syria to fight their “proxy war” with the Assad 
regime the western countries are susceptible for “negligent support” under 
international humanitarian law. Mojtaba Mahdavi amplifies this observation by 
noting the military assistance to the opposition forces turned the syrian spring 
into a proxy war and exacerbated an ugly and bloody civil war among ethnic and 
religious minorities.194 this legal concept applies to countries that support armed 
insurgencies that are likely to cause unexpected violation of human rights.195 this 
doctrine was enunciated in the Tadic case where the iCty grappled with the cardinal 
issue as to whether the Bosnian serb paramilitary militias were acting on behalf of 
Bosnia. the tribunal aptly observed:
…states are not allowed on the one hand to act de facto through indi-
viduals and on the other to disassociate themselves from such conduct when 
these individuals breach international law.196
in juxtaposing this doctrine with the syrian context, it is cogent to argue the 
countries supporting the syrian rebels should be vicarious culpable for their actions. 
the states exercise a considerable degree of control by funding and training the 
rebels intending to overthrow the Assad regime. Judging by the volatile and 
antagonistic relationship among the parties to the conflict it is quite possible for the 
any foreign state to preempt the possible extermination of syrian civilians perceived 
as sympathisers to the regime.
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4.4. The Obligation to Protect Human Rights During Armed Conflict
On a more abstract level customary international law recognises the preventions 
of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression as jus 
cogens.197 this means the obligation to prevent these atrocities cannot be shirked by 
any member states irrespective of whether they are signatories to their respective 
conventions. this principle was enunciated by in the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons where the iCJ stated:
it is undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian law 
applicable in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human 
person and “elementary considerations of humanity” as the Court put it in its 
Judgment of 9 April 1949 in the Corfu Channel case (I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 22), 
that the hague and Geneva Conventions have enjoyed a broad accession. 
Further these fundamental rules are to be observed by all states whether 
or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they 
constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law.198
Against the backdrop of this quote, it is reasonable to argue the countries supporting 
the rebel movement are culpable of offenses should they be committed irrespective of 
their capacity and jurisdictions. this principle applies to the syrian situation is inherently 
skewed in favour of the regime fighting various rebel factions that does not nullify its 
status and obligation as participants in non-international conflict.199
4.5. Regime Change by Other Means
the hybrid version of r2P invoked by NAtO seeking to oust President Assad is 
analogous to rehashing the failed campaign in Libya. Colonel Gaddafi ruled the 
country with an iron fist for four decades rule and was accused of sponsoring global 
terrorism the most prominent incident being the Lockerbie bombing in 1986.200 
despite the limited democratic space Libya boasted of high living standards 
compared to other “hydrocarbon economies” which are epitomised by endemic 
corruption and abject poverty. Furthermore, he ensured relative stability by 
repressing the various islamist movements in the country.201 in 2003 Libya initiated 
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rapprochement with the west by paying compensation to the victims of Lockerbie, 
extraditing the chief suspects of the attack, abolishing its nuclear weapons and 
renouncing global terrorism.202 
when the Arab spring poured into Libya it morphed into an organised armed 
rebel movement in Benghazi seeking to oust Gaddafi from power.203 this insurgency 
known as the rebel Council (rC) comprised of government defectors, disgruntled 
islamist militias and several political dissidents all of whom were supported by the 
west. the security Council passed resolutions number 1970 and 1973 informally 
known as “Operation unified Protector” as the blue print for military intervention.204 
Noteworthy, russia and China strenuously opposed military intervention against Libya 
citing it would be tantamount to infringing upon Libya’s sovereignty. On the 15 April 
2011 russian Foreign Minister sergei Lavrov reiterated the need for a political and 
diplomatic solution since uN lacked the mandate to initiate regime change.205
this resolution provided for the alternative of military intervention by an 
international coalition incase diplomacy failed to remedy the situation.206 in 
attempting to remedy the situation NAtO states issued a “no fly zone” in Libya and 
thereafter launched a series of airstrike against the Gaddafi forces.207 this double 
edged approach was construed as a means of the r2P to prevent the civilian 
atrocities. Nonetheless, it turned ominous after the ultimate downfall and gruesome 
execution of Gaddafi by the rebels. however, a cursory glance of this doctrine as 
implemented by the NAtO countries was tarnished with undertones of “regime 
change” and to some degree the expansion of “western imperialism.”208 this grim 
reality was confirmed after the u.s. secretary state hilary Clinton appeared on live 
television applauding Gaddafi’s death by quipping “we came, we saw, he died!”209 
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this abnormal euphoria surrounding the humiliating downfall of Colonel Gaddafi 
confirmed suspicions that the intervention was driven by economic interests rather 
than humanitarian concerns.210
in light of Pillar 3 of the r2P NAtO just like any other international stakeholder had 
the obligation to initiate post armed conflict reconciliation and reconstruction.211 this 
duty would be instrumental in restoring harmony and the rule of law in a country that 
came apart under tribal and sectarian violence. But NAtO shirked this responsibility 
by failing to put in place concrete efforts to enhance reconstruction and reconciliation 
in the country. this obligation to rebuild is instrumental in restoring normalcy after 
the armed conflicts.212 in Libya the downfall of Gaddafi left a volatile power vacuum 
which culminated into the socio economic disintegration, sectarian violence, human 
trafficking and terrorist insurgency.213 As at 2015 the once prosperous nation was 
downgraded into a failed state with insurgence groups loyal to the islamic state 
controlling large swaths of the country.214 this failure prompted russia to pour scorn 
over r2P as tool for redressing humanitarian concern in syria.
Concluding Remarks
in summary, the right to Protect (r2P) supports measures to protect civilians 
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression.215 
Nonetheless, its abysmal failure in Libya has resulted in widespread skepticism 
towards its viability in redressing humanitarian crises.216 this uncertainty spurred 
russia to oppose its application in syria for fear of replicating into regime change 
and igniting into a full blown regional conflict.
Furthermore, the russian intervention in syria is bound to elicit mixed reactions 
across the geopolitical spectrum. On one hand, the west has considers it as the 
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permutation of the cold war in the region with russia flexing its military muscles. 
Conversely, russian support has contributed to the sustenance of the Assad regime 
and the ultimate annihilation of the islamic state and rebels who threatened civilian 
welfare. Against this backdrop the overall objective of the intervention falls well within 
the purview of Pillar 2 of the r2P which intends to safeguard both national sovereignty 
and humanitarian welfare.217 Furthermore, President Putin’s commitment to ensure 
post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction is representative falls in line with Pillar 3 
of the principle which demands restoration of the rule of law and normalcy.
in stark contrast, the NAtO intervention is beset with overtures of regime change 
after their repeated calls for overthrowing of the Assad regime. this position is 
augmented is by their overt support of the syrian rebels who are active participants 
in the conflict. As held in the Nicaragua v. USA and DRC v. Uganda cases this approach 
infringes on Arts. 2(4) and 51 of the uN Charter. in addition, there is inherent risk 
NAtO states will be held liable for the atrocities committed by the syrian rebels 
under the doctrine of “belligerent occupation.” in light of these divergent strategies 
and opinions it would be prudent for all the material stakeholders to adopt a more 
efficient and cohesive form of post-conflict resolution mechanism in restoring 
normalcy in the country.
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